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Research Summary: Past research views institutions
as stable and slow to change and uses institutional dif-
ferences to explain cross-national variation in entrepre-
neurship. This article introduces a new perspective to
institutional theory, that of short-term institutional
change. Integrating insights from cognitive science
allows us to theorize not just about the significance of
short-term institutional change but also about why and
how deterioration versus improvements in institutions
have distinct effects. We test how short-term institu-
tional change impacts entrepreneurship in a cross-
country multilevel study. We find that short-term
change in the rule of law affects entrepreneurial entry
and that institutional deterioration weighs heavier than
institutional improvement. We argue and find that
changes in the rule of law are more consequential for
entrepreneurship compared to changes in business
regulations.
Managerial Summary: It is known that the quality of
institutions affects individuals' decisions to pursue
entrepreneurship. Yet, we newly investigate effects of
year-to-year changes in national institutions. Not only
changes in business regulations matter, but also
changes in more fundamental institutional aspects,
especially in the rule of law. We find that institutional
change has an impact because, on its basis, potential
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entrepreneurs form expectations about the future and
therefore about the riskiness of their investment. Dete-
riorations compared to improvements in the rule of law
are more consequential for entrepreneurship, consis-
tent with the fact that losses loom larger than gains in
human decisions.
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Entrepreneurship Monitor, institutional change, prospect
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The classic literature on institutions assumes that they are stable and slow to change
(North, 2005; Williamson, 2000). That perspective has influenced comparative entrepreneur-
ship research, which relies on institutions to explain cross-country differences in entrepre-
neurship (reviewed by Urbano, Aparicio, & Audretsch, 2019; Terjesen, Hessels, & Li, 2016).
However, the emphasis on the stability of institutions means that the empirical reality of
institutional changes has been overlooked. Especially, the consequences of short-term (year-
to-year) institutional changes are poorly understood theoretically and empirically.
Davidsson (2020) in his review of entrepreneurship and strategy research notes the absence
of research on how changes in context may impact entrepreneurial activity. We agree with
his call to consider change. To answer it, we take emerging research on institutional
change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) as our starting point, yet we advance the behavioral
assumptions underlying institutional theory. While at least since North (1990) institutional
economists recognized the limitations of rational choice theory, less has been achieved
moving forward to offer a replacement. We fill this gap with insights from prospect theory
and more generally research on heuristics from cognitive science (Gigerenzer &
Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) to theorize how and why short-term
changes in formal institutions impact entrepreneurial entry. We focus on changes in the
rule of law which critically shape how much uncertainty entrepreneurs have to cope with
in their country context. Thus, we ask: How does short-term institutional change impact
individuals' decisions to enter entrepreneurship?
Research on the impact of institutional changes is of theoretical and of practical impor-
tance (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Small institutional changes can accumulate to significantly
larger change and first small changes may signal future trends (Acemoglu, Egorov, &
Sonin, 2020) affecting an individual's willingness to invest time, energy, and other resources
into starting a business. Such change may be especially consequential when it signals a down-
ward trend of deterioration in institutions, which leads to higher uncertainty and increases
the prospect of losses, to which individuals are particularly averse (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). Compared to institutional deterioration, improvements in institutions
enhance predictability about potential returns from entrepreneurs' efforts and may open up
new opportunities. Both would render individuals more willing to invest time, energy, and
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other resources into starting a business. Thus, integrating insights from cognitive science
research allows us to theorize about the relevance of short-term institutional change for entre-
preneurs' entry decisions and about differential effects of institutional improvement versus
institutional deterioration.
We apply a multilevel theory design whereby entrepreneurs, as economic agents at the
microlevel, respond to changes in the institutional environment at the macrolevel. We utilize a
large multilevel dataset spanning 1.45 million individual observations from 15 years and up to
69 countries. We find support for our hypothesized effects. We also offer extensions to evaluate
the robustness of our results, considering different time frames, alternative indicators of the rule
of law, changes in regulation, as well as institutional change effects on different types of entre-
preneurial efforts.
Our research contributes to institutional theory by introducing a new dynamic perspective
on institutions. We newly conceptualize short-term gradual institutional change and theorize
the role of institutional deteriorations and institutional improvements for entrepreneurship.
This perspective complements the institutional theory literature in economics, sociology and
management (e.g., Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2011; Scott, 2005; Williamson, 2000),
which does not examine or theorize the effects of short-term institutional changes but rather
emphasizes the stability of institutions including in their effects on entrepreneurship
(Baumol, 1996). Equally, historical analyses (e.g., North, 2005) describe institutional changes
that unfold over decades or centuries rather than year-to-year or a few years. We demonstrate
empirically that changes in fundamental institutions of the rule of law indeed take place over
short periods (between 1 and 5 years) and meaningfully impact entrepreneurship. We also offer
predictions and first analyses on how institutional change may impact different types of entre-
preneurship including strategic, high-growth oriented activity. In sum, our work provides
“proof-of-concept” that institutional change matters in line with calls for more attention to con-
sider the consequences of change in contexts for entrepreneurship (see also Davidsson, 2020).
We see much scope for future contributions that embrace a dynamic understanding of institu-
tions in global strategy, international business, and comparative entrepreneurship research.
Moreover, to theorize the effects of institutional change we reexamine the microlevel
assumptions of institutional theory and propose a behavioral lens that utilizes insights from cog-
nitive science. This contrasts with past research which assumes that individuals respond to
institutions only as fully rationally optimizing actors (e.g., Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Stephan, 2013;
North, 1990, 2005; Williamson, 1985, 2000). Yet utilizing research on heuristics from cognitive
science (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) helps us to elaborate the
behavioral assumptions of institutional theory and in turn, enables a more accurate understand-
ing of the mechanisms of how and why institutions and institutional change affect individual
economic activity such as entrepreneurial entry.1 Specifically, considering individual's heuristic
thinking as set out in cognitive science helps to understand why even short-term institutional
change is significant and why institutional deteriorations weigh more heavily in deterring entre-
preneurial entry than institutional improvements in spurring entry. Just like past research that
assumes individuals react as rationally optimizing actors to institutions, we equally are unable
to measure the microlevel processes at play. However, our findings are remarkably consistent
with our predictions derived from cognitive science. Finally, our research follows calls by inter-
national strategy scholars who observe that institutional analysis can be enriched by integrating
insights from disciplines such as psychology/cognitive science (Cuervo-Cazurra, Mudambi, &
Pedersen, 2019).
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2 | CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Unbundling institutions
The function of institutions is to mitigate uncertainty and enhance human cooperation; the lat-
ter idea can be traced as far back as antiquity, see, for example, Cicero (1998) [51 B.C.]) De Re
Publica. The most fundamental level of institutions is the values and general principles held by
society at large. This is what Ostrom (2008) calls the (a) meta-constitutional level institutions
and Williamson (2000) terms informal institutions. These commonly held values and principles
translate next into more specific (b) constitutional institutions (Brennan & Buchanan, 2000) also
referred to as political institutions (Banalieva, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Sarathy, 2018). These are
higher-order rules (Ostrom, 2008) that include the procedural rules about making rules. Consti-
tutional institutions impose constraints on political agents engaged in the “process through
which the rules are determined” so that they “may be acting within the rules (the political con-
stitution) that constrain their behavior in changing the rules” (Brennan & Buchanan, 2000,p. 9;
italics are theirs). In that way, these (political) constitutional institutions shape (c) lower order
rules that determine the play of the game and include specific business regulations.
Constitutional institutions have a fundamental effect on businesses and entrepreneurs. Even
if the lower order rules (regulations) are more directly experienced by entrepreneurs, the effect
of regulations ultimately depends on the quality of constitutional institutions (Levie &
Autio, 2011). Again, this is because the latter defines the boundaries for regulations
(Levie & Autio, 2011) and describe how regulations may be introduced, modified and
implemented (Ostrom, 2008; Williamson, 2000).
While Brennan and Buchanan (2000) focus on constitutional constraints imposed on politi-
cians in making lower order rules, the notion of constitutional constraints is more extensive
including the wider concept of the rule of law, seen by many as central to any institutional
order (Skaaning, 2010). The rule of law is “a bulwark against arbitrary power” (Epstein, 2011,
p. 191), or as further elaborated by Kasper, Streit, and Boettke (2012, p. 178): “The basic concept
that underpins the rule of law is that political power can only be exercised on the basis and
within the constraints of the law and that certain substantive and procedural institutions are
needed to protect civic and economic liberties from arbitrary interventions by authorities.” The
latter definition clarifies the two key elements bridged by the rule of law: constraints on
the arbitrary power of the government are functionally linked to ensuring that both the individ-
ual's “right to treatment as an equal” and other specific human rights (liberties) that follow
from it (Dworkin, 1977, p. 273) are respected.
Concerning the economy, the protection of property rights forms part of the rule of law
(Epstein, 2011). It places constraints on the likelihood of expropriation of entrepreneurs and
businesses, and therefore mitigates uncertainty (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Estrin,
Korosteleva, & Mickiewicz, 2013). More specifically, the comparative entrepreneurship litera-
ture argues that enhancing the protection of property rights, through the rule of law, assists
entrepreneurs in accessing the resources required to start business ventures, such as finance
and capital (De Soto, 2000; Estrin et al., 2013).
A strong rule of law corresponds to a fair judicial system independent from the executive
branch of the government (Epstein, 2011), ensuring that contracts are enforced and that prop-
erty rights are secure, leading to lower transaction costs (Aron, 2000). A strong rule of law
implies that everybody is treated equally and fairly by government agents (Kasper et al., 2012),
reducing the scope for political opportunism such as corruption, clientelism, patronage, and
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cronyism (Fukuyama, 2015). It thereby creates an inclusive society and a broad base for entre-
preneurship (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019). Taken together, because an effective rule of law cre-
ates greater predictability and less uncertainty for individuals to act, it can encourage
individuals to invest time and resources into starting businesses. With an effective rule of law in
place, entrepreneurs can be sure that the fruits of their venturing efforts are secure and that
they will be the ones reaping the returns, rather than being subject to expropriation by the gov-
ernment or other agents (Estrin, Mickiewicz, & Stephan, 2016).
2.2 | Institutional change
2.2.1 | The relevance of institutional change
Until this point, in line with the established literature, our discussion has been static, focused
on the level or quality of rule of law.2 However, humans in their decisions consider not only the
status quo; they also consider possible future directions of change (Banalieva et al., 2018). New
economic projects—such as setting up a business—imply strategic investment in physical and
human capital with the hope of future returns. Therefore, the assessment of future prospects
matters to any type of strategic decision and may be based on observed directions of change in
the environment. Both, Banalieva et al. (2018) and Easterly (2013) suggest that it is not just the
institutional status quo, but also the direction of institutional change that affects the behavior
of economic agents. While Banalieva et al. (2018) focus on changes in regulation, com-
plementing our approach, in Easterly's (2013) assessment, the historical episodes of increased
freedom (or in other words, decreases in the scope of arbitrary government) lead to mutually
reinforcing processes of entrepreneurship and economic growth. Thus, the perception of how
institutions evolve is at least as important as that of the status quo: investment and entrepre-
neurship happens when future prospects are attractive. One historical example is China: after
political change in the late 1970s that implied less oppressive government, China saw an
increase in entrepreneurship (Easterly, 2013; Huang, 2008). It was the promise of further
improvements implicit in early Chinese political change alleviating the threat of mass repres-
sion, which unleashed a wave of rural entrepreneurship that helped to transform the economy
and instill a trajectory of growth (Coase & Wang, 2012).3
2.2.2 | Short-term institutional change
While there are theoretical reasons and evidence that future prospects matter (Banalieva
et al., 2018), the comparative entrepreneurship literature does not typically consider the effect
of changes in institutions that may alter future prospects (see also Davidsson, 2020).
We refer to short-term institutional change as alternations in formal institutions (such as
the rule of law or regulations) that typically take place gradually, evolving over periods of time,
for example, 1–5 years, and which are the result of the social, negotiated character of institu-
tions (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). We discuss each of the elements of this definition in turn: the
duration, the degree of change, and the negotiated character of institutions.
First, it helps to contrast the ”short-term” with the long-term time scales over which institu-
tions are argued to change. For instance, Williamson (2000) suggests that institutions evolve
over decades or centuries. He cites the European Union as one example for such evolving
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institutions. Thus, it strikes us as reasonable to define short-term change as taking place over a
year up to 5 years, in contrast to long-term change spanning multiple decades and centuries. In
turn, medium-term changes might be characterized as those extending for one to two decades.
Again, because the literature considers institutions mostly as stable, we are on new ground set-
ting out these parameters for the time scale of changes. We will offer first tests for short-term
time frames in this article and invite future research to explore medium-term changes, once
data to test these become available in the future.
Second, with regard to the degree of change, we argue that short-term institutional change
will typically be gradual (limited change) rather than radical (substantial change). For the
avoidance of doubt, short-term change can also be radical, fundamentally shifting or even
replacing existing institutional arrangements. Such radical change is rare but highly consequen-
tial when it happens, and thus attracts attention. Examples of substantial institutional changes
are revolutions, violent coups d'état's (Bylund & McCaffrey, 2017), or changes in political
regime generated by more peaceful means (the implosion of the Soviet system in 1989–1990 in
Central and Eastern Europe). We argue that most short-term institutional change, however,
unfolds gradually in an evolutionary manner. Fukuyama (2015) documents historical examples
of such gradual changes in countries like Britain or Prussia, both focused on strengthening the
rule of law. A growing body of research argues that institutional change need not only happen
through episodes of “institutional upheaval” or moments of abrupt and large transformation,
but draws attention to gradual change that may accumulate over time into significant institu-
tional transformation (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).
Third, the negotiated character of formal institutions helps to explain why we see short-term
gradual institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) argue that the institutional order is a
function of active, ongoing “ambiguous compromises” among key actors. These compromises
or settlements are relatively durable but always contested and “based on specific coalitional
dynamics, they are always vulnerable to shifts” (Mahoney and Thelen (2010), p. 8). Swings in a
balance of power, chances in environmental conditions, and “unforeseen changes in the ongo-
ing distribution of resources” (Mahoney and Thelen (2010), p. 9) trigger efforts to reinterpret
and modify the institutions, which is facilitated by the unavoidable “degree of openness in the
interpretation and implementation of these rules” (Mahoney and Thelen (2010), p. 10). There-
fore, institutions are changing continuously. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) consider that political
institutions corresponding to constitutions, and in particular the rule of law, can evolve and
shift in subtle ways over time, through endogenous developments.
If we accept that short-term institutional change is common and that it is typically gradual,
then one of the difficulties for entrepreneurs starting their businesses will be to discern the
direction of change in institutions. In some countries, the incremental change in the constitu-
tional setup is gradually taking place, but its direction is never formally announced, as exempli-
fied at the time of writing by an ongoing constitutional conversion4 away from the rule of law
in Hungary and Poland.5 Nor are institutional changes constrained to emerging or formerly
communist economies. In October 2020, the rating agency Moody's downgraded the UK credit
rating partly in response to Covid spending but also citing concerns over “the weakening in the
UK's institutions and governance”: “While still high, the quality of the UKʼs legislative and
executive institutions has diminished in recent years.” (see Financial Times, October 17, 20206).
Alternatively, a gradual adjustment of institutions over a period of several years can also work
toward creating stronger constitutional institutions, such as when the emerging economies
strengthen the rule of law including the independence of their courts (e.g., at the time of writ-
ing, North Macedonia).7
6 MICKIEWICZ ET AL.
2.3 | Institutional change and entrepreneurial entry
We define entrepreneurial entry in line with the occupational choice perspective as the individ-
ual decision to start a business (Gartner, 1988). This choice is shaped by individual characteris-
tics of entrepreneurs, as well as by external enablers and inhibitors located in the environment
(Davidsson, 2016, 2020; Davidsson, Recker, & von Briel, 2020). We focus on the environment,
and our analyses control for the individual characteristics.
We posit that individuals need to perceive and assess the implications of continuous
changes in these environmental enablers and inhibitors when deciding whether to enter entre-
preneurship. Yet, a large body of literature rooted in cognitive science highlights that individ-
uals' perception of their environment is filtered through heuristics and biases (Gigerenzer &
Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman, 2011). This is particularly so when the environment is uncertain,
for instance, when it requires making sense of the gradual changes in institutions. By applying
heuristics, individuals focus selectively on specific information, rather than trying to process
complete information and engage in complex decision-making methods as envisaged by ratio-
nal agent models (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahneman, 2011).8
In Kahneman and Tversky's seminal work (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), heuristics are depicted as biases that occur in situations of uncertainty, and
they are contrasted with fully rational or “optimal” decision-making. Their foundational
research program introduced prospect theory to economics and business research
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Today, cognitive science research in the tradition of Kahneman
and Tversky recognizes heuristics as cognitive shortcuts that help individuals make efficient
decisions in everyday settings (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Kahneman, 2011).
This newer cognitive science research (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) shows that heuristics
can be adaptive and represent ecologically (rather than perfectly) rational decision-making strat-
egies “with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more
complex methods.” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011,p. 454). Heuristics outperform more com-
plex decision-making strategies that consider (more) complete information, especially in uncer-
tain situations where full information is not available (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). This
efficiency of heuristic decision-making explains why it is so widespread and persistently used,
including by managers (Luan, Reb, & Gigerenzer, 2019; also: Lejarraga & Pindard-
Lejarraga, 2020). In fact, if we were to consider all possible options and optimize every decision,
then making even simple decisions would take so long that we would be unable to function in
everyday life. Moreover, the efficiency of heuristics in uncertain situations suggests that they
are a particularly useful tool to apply to entrepreneurship, as the decision to start a business is
characteristically fraught with uncertainty (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). In sum, individuals
perceive the world around them including institutional change by applying cognitive shortcuts
rather than “objectively reflecting” reality in all its detail.
Changes in the environment are one important cue that draws individuals' attention. In the
words of Kahneman (2011, p. 202): “[w]hen an unpredicted event occurs, we immediately
adjust our view of the world to accommodate the surprise.” Thus, change is more important for
heuristically operating individuals than stability, as it signals a potential need to adjust and
adapt decision-making and to mobilize resources. If there is no change in the environment,
individuals can continue to operate as they always have; they know and can predict their envi-
ronment (Kahneman, 2011). Change, however, increases uncertainty and may imply either a
threat that the individual needs to protect themselves from, or an opportunity that they may
wish to take advantage of. Hence, it is ecologically rational for individuals to be attuned to
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noticing change and overvalue the importance of recent changes (Gigerenzer et al., 1999;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Changes in the rule of law are likely to be noticed precisely because the rule of law is so con-
sequential for the returns that entrepreneurs can reap from their investment into starting a
business. An improving rule of law means more constraints on arbitrary governments where
property rights become more effective. This increases the chances that entrepreneurs benefit
from their investments (rather than those returns being appropriated by arbitrary governments
or being lost because contracts are poorly enforced and criminal acts not effectively punished).
Hence, when the rule of law improves, the outcomes of entrepreneurship become relatively
more predictable, and we may see an increase in entrepreneurial activity. It may well be that a
short-term change in the rule of law will not be sustained, yet because change and recent events
are particularly consequential in adaptive heuristic decision-making, even a short-term change
will have an impact.
Where the rule of law is deteriorating, even to a small extent, prospecting entrepreneurs are
faced with higher unpredictability. There is greater uncertainty whether their investments and
efforts to start a business will result in the expected outcome, and an increased chance that the
fruits of their labor will not yield the expected benefits. In sum, individuals likely reduce entre-
preneurial activity when institutions deteriorate, and increase it when the rule of law becomes
stronger. Thus, we posit:
Hypothesis (H1). Changes in rule of law impact on the likelihood of entrepreneurial
entry, such that improvements (deteriorations) in rule of law increase (diminish) the
likelihood of entrepreneurial entry.
2.4 | Institutional deteriorations versus improvements
So far, our arguments implied that entrepreneurs respond to changes in the rule of law in their
environment in a symmetric fashion. However, insights on cognitive heuristics, especially the
principle of loss aversion, suggest potential asymmetric effects of the direction of institutional
change on an individual's decision to enter entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2017). Thus, deterio-
rations in institutions likely affect the decision of prospecting entrepreneurs through different
mechanisms than institutional improvements, and the effect of deteriorations is stronger than
that of improvements.
In line with the literature on institutional quality that describes the latter with reference to
the rule of law (Rothstein, 2013), we define institutional deteriorations as institutional change
that diminishes the rule of law leading to outcomes that are less fair and inclusive. In particular,
a deterioration in the rule of law means that individuals can be less certain about the returns of
their investments, as monetary returns may be appropriated by corrupt officials, and courts are
more biased no longer guaranteeing fair outcomes. Moreover, diminished personal security
that comes with more arbitrary government will also have an impact on entrepreneurs
(Mickiewicz & Kaasa, 2020). Institutional improvements on the other hand refer to institutional
change that leads to fairer and more inclusive institutions (Rothstein, 2013).
Critically, institutional deteriorations and improvements have different psychological effects
on individuals' decision-making (Banalieva et al., 2018). Crucial for understanding the effects of
institutional deterioration on entrepreneurship is the role of loss aversion postulated by prospect
theory. It states that individuals are more sensitive to losses and threats than they are to gains
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and opportunities of equal size (Barberis & Thaler, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992).9 Again, this is ecologically rational as losses and threats are more consequen-
tial for the individual, leading to potential harm and depleting resources (Hobfoll, 1989). Such
situations are difficult, both psychologically and practically, as they imply a loss of control over
one's life and enhance uncertainty. This is what a deteriorating rule of law implies: if govern-
ments become more arbitrary, courts less fair, and property rights poorly enforced, then the
prospecting entrepreneur has less control over what happens. The success of their start-up
efforts and their eventual returns are less under their control and hence more uncertain.
In turn, institutional improvements enhance entrepreneurs' predictability, give them confi-
dence that they can reap the rewards of their investments into starting a business; they may also
open up new opportunities for businesses. By contrast, when institutions deteriorate, invest-
ment is more likely to be put on hold due to increased uncertainty and higher risk of expropria-
tion. Thereby entrepreneurs make sure they do not standout, as working on high-value
business opportunities could make them attractive targets of expropriation by either officials or
criminals (Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Bailey, 2015; Sutter, Webb, Kistruck, Ketchen Jr, &
Ireland, 2017). Because higher value projects will be dropped, the overall number of entrepre-
neurial projects will decrease as well.
In sum, our discussion suggests that deteriorations in rule of law will have a more pro-
nounced impact on entrepreneurial activity than institutional improvements. In other words,
institutional change has asymmetrical effects, with deteriorations weighing more heavily than
improvements.10 Thus, we posit:
Hypothesis (H2). Institutional deteriorations (in the rule of law) have more pro-
nounced impact on the likelihood of entrepreneurial entry compared to institutional
improvements (in the rule of law).
3 | DATA AND METHODS
3.1 | Datasets
To test our hypotheses, we combine Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data on working-
age individuals, with data on institutions from the Polity IV project. For the control variables,
we use information from the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal and World Bank. We
drew our sample from every country surveyed in GEM, available at the time of writing; how-
ever, missingness in some macrovariables was a limiting factor resulting in data on up to
69 countries. Thus, our starting point is a cross-country multilevel panel data of individuals for
the period 2001–2015. The GEM project utilizes harmonized cluster sampling, normally of at
least 2,000 individuals per country to identify nascent entrepreneurs. It measures individual
characteristics of both nonentrepreneurs and entrepreneurs, and different aspects of entrepre-
neurship (Bosma, Coduras, Litovsky, & Seaman, 2012). GEM identifies adults engaged in entre-
preneurial activity, including self-employment. It provides an internationally comparable
dataset that is widely used for entrepreneurship research (e.g., Bowen & de Clercq, 2008; Frey-
tag & Thurik, 2010; Valdez & Richardson, 2013). The sampling procedure is reviewed by Reyn-
olds et al. (2005). More generally, as discussed by Davidsson (2016), the GEM project offers the
best available set of indicators measuring entrepreneurial engagement harmonized across
countries.
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The advantage of using the individual-level variables instead of averaging the effects at
country level is that we get stronger individual-level controls (matched for individuals). Second,
averaging at the country level alone does not account for within-country heterogeneity in vari-
ables: averages tell us little about the actual distributions of characteristics used in the models.
These characteristics may be highly skewed, making country-level means questionable mea-
sures if not accompanied by corresponding individual variables.
3.2 | Dependent variable
Reynolds et al. (2005) discuss how the dependent variable we use is assembled. It is the GEM
construct of the nascent entrepreneur; an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
GEM questionnaire-defined criteria are met and of 0 otherwise. These criteria focus on individ-
uals who moved from having a business idea to taking concrete steps to start a new venture. At
the same time, the business has not been operational for more than 3 months, that is, it has not
yet transferred from the nascent start-up phase to the phase of new business. Nascent entrepre-
neurship is a popular dependent variable in the empirical literature (e.g., Estrin et al., 2016 for
an application; and Davidsson, 2016 for an overview), because it suffers less from simultaneity
(endogeneity) vis-à-vis some of the characteristics of individuals and from selection bias.
Nascent entrepreneurship conceptually captures the notion of “new entry” well, as it focuses on
the first steps toward starting a business and thus is not subject to survival bias (whereby only
certain start-up efforts are successful; Davidsson, 2016). Thus, nascent entrepreneurship is a
pure and direct measure of early stage entrepreneurship.
3.3 | Independent variables and controls
3.3.1 | Rule of law
Following the recommendations derived from Munck and Verkuilen's (2002) comparative anal-
ysis of the quality of institutional indicators, we use data from the Polity project as it is seen as
superior to extant alternatives in terms of its methodology. The Polity project originated with
the University of Maryland and is now run by the Centre for Systemic Peace. Its unit of observa-
tion is “the polity” that is government or formal political organization defined spatially. The
variables included define the characteristics of the polities, which in most cases are recognized
countries (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2016).
In our theoretical discussion, we emphasized two connected elements of the rule of law:
(a) institutional checks and balances and (b) individual rights. Following Møller and
Skaaning (2012), we consider the first element to condition the second, and therefore we focus
on the former in our core empirical tests. The most clear-cut indicator of the institutional
checks and balances available from the Polity dataset relates to the Effective constraints on the
executive branch of the government. In the seminal paper, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) demon-
strated that it has a stronger impact on key economic outcomes compared to contracting institu-
tions. The level of executive constraints is measured as the “extent of institutionalized
constraints on the decision-making powers” of the executive branch of the government
(Marshall et al., 2016). It ranges from 1 (few) to 7 (high) levels of constraints. Higher levels of
constraints include the power of a strong and independent judiciary system, able to contain
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illegal activities of the executive. Examples of the use of this indicator in empirical business
research include Estrin, Korosteleva, and Mickiewicz (2013); Estrin, Mickiewicz, and Step-
han (2013); Estrin et al. (2016) on entrepreneurship, and Besley and Mueller (2018) on foreign
direct investment. We will use this measure in the main tests of our hypotheses.
However, we are evaluating changes (over 1 year, and over 5 years) rather than levels, and
as emphasized in the methodological discussion by the Polity project team, the evaluation of
annual changes in this indicator comes with some measurement error since independent evalu-
ations of short-term change made by experts sometimes differ (Marshall et al., 2016).11 A com-
posite measure that captures a number of significant changes across a range of indicators of
constitutional institutions, even if less focused, may have therefore an advantage. A departure
from the rule of law in one aspect may be difficult to evaluate; but several parallel departures
will be more visible.
This measurement issue motivated us to also include a more composite measure from the
Polity IV database: the Institutionalized Democracy index. The Institutionalized Democracy index
is assessed on a scale from 10 to +10, with +10 being most democratic. It combines (a) the
executive constraints as above, with two other elements: (b) individual rights and (c) electoral
processes “through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies
and leaders” (Marshall et al., 2016,p. 14). The definition of the rule of law proposed by Kasper
et al. (2012) that we adopted includes the first two elements. However, the definition we use
excludes the third element. Yet, the electoral process can become part of the rule of law con-
struct either because individual rights also include rights to political representation, or because
the electoral process imposes the ultimate effective constraints on the executive. At the same
time, the inclusion of electoral democracy leads to tension with other elements of rule of law
because of the possibility of majoritarian tyranny (Epstein, 2011).
Let us consider this issue further. Procedures and conditions conducive to political com-
petition, when effective, are seen as the defining feature of democracy in a narrow sense
(Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). This competition may help to strengthen
checks on the arbitrariness in the government, because each political party faces a realistic
chance of losing elections and is therefore more inclined to act with some self-restraint. Yet,
it can also undermine the rule of law because a majority can make decisions that undermine
rights of minorities (Epstein, 2011; Møller & Skaaning, 2012) destroying, therefore, the con-
dition of equal respect and treatment.12 Hence, in our view, including the electoral process
makes the Institutionalized Democracy index a noisier measure of the rule of law, even if
electoral processes are included in some theory interpretations of the rule of law (Møller &
Skaaning, 2012).
Note that while the Institutionalized Democracy index is assessed on a scale of 10 to +10,
the executive constraints measure ranges from 1 to 7. The differences in scales between the two
measures imply that the size of the effects is not directly comparable.
3.3.2 | An alternative take: rule of law as law and order
While we established a clear link from our theory to empirical measures, alternative conceptu-
alizations of the rule of law exist. In particular, Rule of Law is part of the World Development
Indicators from the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), which is popular in
empirical business research (see discussion in Cuervo-Cazurra, Gaur, & Singh, 2019). This
World Bank measure compiles a large number of indicators, and stresses a result-oriented
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dimension of order and protection from fellow citizens, included in some interpretations of rule
of law. In turn, it does not include the dimension of individual rights beyond the right to prop-
erty (Møller & Skaaning, 2012; Skaaning, 2010). In our view, protection of other human rights
including personal security is part of rule of law, and impacts entrepreneurship (Mickiewicz &
Kaasa, 2020). Nevertheless, given the popularity of the World Bank measure of rule of law, we
run tests using it as an alternative.
3.3.3 | Change in the rule of law
We calculate change in the rule of law by subtracting the score in the previous year (t-1) from
that in the current year (t). As an alternative measure to these 1-year changes, we also include
5-year changes subtracting the value in year t-5 from that in year t. We do this for each year in
our dataset. Thus, improvements in the rule of law have a positive sign and deteriorations a
negative sign on our institutional change variable. All analyses control for the initial level of
institutions (either year t-1 or t-5 correspondingly) to avoid biased coefficients for change
(Bergh & Fairbank, 2002).
Over the time period, we evaluate institutional change, we notice that for Constraints
on the executive, the following countries showed annual increases between 2001 and 2015:
Argentina, Burkina Faso, Guatemala, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand (twice). While
levels of Constraints on the executive decreased in Russia, Thailand (twice), and Venezuela.
As discussed above, the Institutionalized Democracy index is more fine-grained, and in addi-
tion to the countries listed above, it also detects increases in Chile, Croatia, and Poland,
and decreases in Belgium and the Czech Republic, during the same period. Overall,
Thailand is the most institutionally volatile with multiple episodes of increases and
decreases in the rule of law.
In turn, calculating changes in the World Bank Rule of law measure is problematic. This
indicator is generally ill-suited for comparison across time, because it is normalized for each
year separately with zero mean and unit standard deviation (for criticism, see Skaaning, 2010).
For models, for which we will distinguish between negative and positive change (Table 5), we
alleviate the problem by categorizing the World Bank measure, taking 33 and 67% centiles as
cut-off points; this way we analyze three categories: substantial negative change, little change,
substantial positive change.
3.3.4 | Regulatory institutions
While we focus on the rule of law, we also need to control for the entrepreneurship-relevant
elements of the regulations. We include an aggregate indicator that may be considered as most
directly related to entrepreneurship: the Business Freedom index from Heritage Foundation/
Wall Street Journal database. It includes measures related to the difficulty of starting a business,
obtaining licenses, and closing a business (Miller, Kim, & Holmes, 2015). Examples of earlier
cross-country empirical work that focuses on the regulation of entry (and other aspects of regu-
lation) and utilizes GEM data can be found in McMullen, Bagby, and Palich (2008); Ardagna
and Lusardi (2010); Levie and Autio (2011); Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2012). Just as with
the rule of law variables, we compute year-to-year changes (first differences) of this indicator
and include the initial levels.
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3.3.5 | Further control variables
The likelihood of an entrepreneurial entry is not only influenced by institutions but also by
other environmental (country) features, and by the individuals' entrepreneurial skills and
traits. With respect to the environmental features, we include indicators that capture the
key economic conditions that may affect entrepreneurial entry decisions: annual real GDP
growth rate that indicates the range of economic opportunities,13 inflation rate that proxies
for another source of uncertainty (alongside institutions) on the macroeconomic level, the
level of economic development that may affect the attractiveness of entrepreneurship (proxied
by GDP per person employed), and income inequality (Gini coefficient) that may affect pat-
terns in access to resources needed for entrepreneurship. All these economic data are taken
from World Bank, except for income inequality which comes from United Nations.14 The
inclusion of such country features is common in comparative entrepreneurship research to
rule out alternative explanations (e.g., Estrin et al., 2013; Gutiérrez-Romero & Méndez-
Errico, 2017).
We use indicators from the GEM survey to control for individual characteristics. We enter
these into our models in two forms, taking advantage of the multilevel structure of our data: as
individual observations and as country-year means, which corresponds to the Mundlak-type
modeling (Mundlak, 1978; see also Bell, Fairbrother, & Jones, 2019). This way we distinguish
between the direct individual influences of all these characteristics and their environmental
effects. For example, we include both the individual variable representing the respondent's
involvement in another established business (for serial entrepreneurship), and the working-age
population prevalence rate of established businesses, calculated from the individual data aggre-
gated up to country-year means. The same logic relates to other variables: representing that an
individual discontinued a business in the last 12 months; acted as a business angel in the past
3 years; their age and age squared; gender; and educational achievement.
Table 1 below presents a list of the variables used in this study and their description and
sources, Table 2 contains descriptive statistics. Correlation table is available as Table A1 in the
online Appendix.
3.4 | Estimation strategy
There is a considerable body of literature on the most appropriate estimators for multilevel data.
We follow the recommendation of Bell et al. (2019) who argue that the Mundlak type models
are superior and more general compared to fixed-effects models. In addition, we follow the rec-
ommendation by Cameron and Miller (2015) and include country (not country-years) random
effects alongside annual dummies. Furthermore, as advised by Cameron and Miller (2015), we
also account for the Level 2 clustering effect, modeling SEs in a specific way they recommend
for discrete choice models that is by including vce(exchangeable) option in Stata.15
Given that we face a dichotomous outcome variable (being involved in nascent start-up
activity or not), either the logit or the probit is appropriate as a link function between the
expected values of the outcomes and the information within our set of explanatory variables.
These two link functions typically render very similar results, yet logit is far less intensive com-
putationally and it also comes with the possibility of transforming the coefficients into odds
ratios. The latter facilitates interpretation as a direct measure of the size of the effect in response
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Individual (between the age 18 and 64) is involved
in starting their own business in nascent stage
(GEM definition, please see Reynolds et al. (2005),
for full description of the criteria) = 1,
otherwise 0
GEM, 2001–2015
Independent variables: Country-year level
Executive
constraints index
Scores from 1 = “unlimited authority” to
7 = “executive subordination”; the higher the
value, the less arbitrariness in the decision-
making powers of chief executives (Marshall
et al., 2016)
Center for Systemic Peace:




Eleven point scale (0–10), ranging from 0 (least
democratic) to ten (most democratic). A
composite index combining executive constraints
(about 50% weight) with competitiveness and
openness of the political process
Center for Systemic Peace:
Polity IV project, 1996–
2015
Rule of Law “[T]he extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular
the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann
et al., 2010,p. 6). Secondary data: multiple sources






Business Freedom The business freedom score encompasses 10
components, all weighted equally; composite
index based on data from the World Bank's “East





GDP per person employed is GDP divided by total
employment in the economy. PPP GDP converted
to 2011 constant international USD, PPP
World Bank, 2001–2015
Annual inflation Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of
the GDP implicit deflator (the ratio of GDP in
current local currency to GDP in constant local
currency)
World Bank, 2001–2015
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market
prices based on constant local currency. Based on
constant 2010 USD
World Bank, 2001–2015
Independent variables: Individual level
Age Age of the respondent in years GEM, 2001–2015
Female Gender of the respondent is female = 1
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to the one unit increase in an explanatory variable. Therefore, we apply logit models, which are
computed in Stata. The general structure of our models takes the following form:
Pr Nascent entrepreneurshipð Þi, t ¼ 1
 ¼ logistic ½β0þβ1 ΔRule of Law Indexð Þi, t
þβ2 Rule of Law Indexð Þi, t1þβ3 ΔRegulatory Indexð Þi, tþβ4 Regulatory Indexð Þi, t1
þXβ5þZβ6 þdtþui
As already mentioned, to eliminate bias, we follow good practice and always supplement our
institutional change variables with the initial values of these variables in levels (Bergh &
Fairbank, 2002), as reflected in the specification above. X represents a matrix of control vari-
ables at the individual level we discussed, and Z relates to the country-year level controls; both
are accompanied by vectors of coefficients. The last two terms represent annual dummy vari-
ables and country random effects correspondingly.
Last but not least, we follow the best practice of centering the continuous variables in the
interaction term on zero.
3.4.1 | Overview of estimations
The first set of results is presented in Table 3.16 The specifications follow the model presented
above and relate entrepreneurial entry to the change in rule of law. The models in Table 3 alter-
nate using the three different institutional indicators discussed above. Next, in Table 4, we
replace annual change with change over 5 years. The focus of these two sets of models is on
testing Hypothesis (H1).
Table 5 offers specifications where we categorize change in the rule of law into three catego-
ries, so that we may distinguish between the effects of negative and positive change, in order to
assess Hypothesis (H2). In these models, “no change” is our benchmark; this is the most fre-




Education Highest achieved level of education categorized





Manages and owns business older than 42 months
Discontinued
business
Discontinued a business in past 12 months
Financed new
business
Financed another business in the last 3 years
Note: GEM sourced individual level variables are also introduced as country-year means in estimated models.
Abbreviations: GDP, gross domestic product; GEM, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor; PPP, Purchasing power parity.
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4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Results of hypotheses tests
The results in Table 3 provide support for Hypothesis (H1): for all three indicators, the odds
ratios for short-term change (year-on-year) in the rule of law on entrepreneurial entry are
TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Individual level variables
Nascent entrepreneur 0.054 0.226 0.0000 1.0000
Age 40.203 13.039 16.000 64.000
Female 0.521 0.500 0.0000 1.0000
Education: Some secondary 0.242 0.428 0.000 1.000
Education: Secondary 0.333 0.471 0.000 1.000
Education: Tertiary 0.364 0.481 0.000 1.000
Owner/manager of established bus 0.076 0.265 0.000 1.000
Discontinued a business 0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000
Financed a business 0.042 0.200 0.000 1.000
Country level variables
Executive constraints (1 year change) 0.002 0.215 4.000 3.000
Executive constraints (level) 6.395 1.268 1.000 7.000
Democracy (1 year change) 0.006 0.449 14.00 6.000
Democracy (level) 8.539 2.668 10.000 10.000
Rule of Law, World Bank (1 year change) 0.003 0.076 0.278 0.445
Rule of Law, World Bank (level) 0.797 0.928 1.623 2.100
Business freedom (1 year change) 0.559 3.865 21.000 26.000
Business freedom (level) 75.071 12.913 35.300 100.00
Mean age 42.062 4.471 25.393 62.116
Mean female 0.522 0.042 0.000 0.730
Mean education: Some secondary 0.250 0.173 0.000 0.904
Mean education: Secondary 0.327 0.141 0.000 0.775
Mean education: Tertiary 0.358 0.168 0.000 0.941
Mean owner/manager of established bus 0.075 0.046 0.000 0.378
Mean discontinued a business 0.036 0.037 0.000 0.303
Mean financed a business 0.041 0.035 0.000 0.293
GDP per person employed (const. 2011 PPP$) 64.157 30.104 1.814 203.704
Annual inflation 3.645 5.071 15.713 56.502
GDP annual growth 2.544 3.371 14.332 26.276
Income inequality (Gini coefficient) 35.914 8.133 22.000 72.000
Abbreviation: PPP, Purchasing power parity.
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TABLE 3 Effects of 1-year changes in the rule of law on nascent entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3)
O. R. SE p O. R. SE p O. R. SE p
Institutional indicators (change and level)
Executive constraints: 1 year change 1.098 0.022 0.00
Executive constraints: 1 year lag 1.152 0.025 0.00
Institutionalized Democracy: 1 year change 1.054 0.010 0.00
Institutionalized Democracy: 1 year lag 1.090 0.011 0.00
Rule of Law (WB): 1 year change 1.770 0.131 0.00
Rule of Law (WB): 1 year lag 1.260 0.063 0.00
Control variables (individual level)
Age 1.114 0.002 0.00 1.114 0.002 0.00 1.115 0.002 0.00
Age squared 0.999 0.000 0.00 0.999 0.000 0.00 0.999 0.000 0.00
Female 0.629 0.005 0.00 0.629 0.005 0.00 0.629 0.005 0.00
Education = some secondary 1.096 0.023 0.00 1.095 0.023 0.00 1.107 0.023 0.00
Education = secondary 1.291 0.025 0.00 1.291 0.025 0.00 1.294 0.025 0.00
Education = tertiary 1.657 0.033 0.00 1.657 0.033 0.00 1.657 0.032 0.00
Manages and owns business >42 months 0.701 0.011 0.00 0.701 0.011 0.00 0.686 0.011 0.00
Discontinued a business in past 12 months 2.241 0.033 0.00 2.242 0.033 0.00 2.225 0.033 0.00
Financed new business(es) in past 3 years 2.076 0.029 0.00 2.076 0.029 0.00 2.076 0.029 0.00
Control variables (country level)
Business Freedom: 1 year change 0.997 0.002 0.07 0.997 0.002 0.07 0.997 0.002 0.12
Business Freedom: 1 year lag 1.003 0.001 0.00 1.004 0.001 0.00 1.003 0.001 0.00
GDP per person employed (const. PPP) 1.000 0.001 0.82 0.999 0.001 0.46 0.998 0.002 0.19
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 1.001 0.002 0.46 1.002 0.002 0.23 1.005 0.002 0.00
GDP growth (annual %) 1.003 0.002 0.13 1.003 0.002 0.08 1.003 0.002 0.13
Income inequality (Gini coefficient) 1.002 0.002 0.34 1.002 0.002 0.36 1.003 0.002 0.15
Mean age 0.828 0.024 0.00 0.826 0.024 0.00 0.831 0.025 0.00
Mean age squared 1.002 0.000 0.00 1.002 0.000 0.00 1.002 0.000 0.00
Share of females 0.478 0.091 0.00 0.479 0.091 0.00 0.382 0.074 0.00
Share of those with some secondary ed. 0.238 0.025 0.00 0.251 0.026 0.00 0.244 0.026 0.00
Share of those with secondary ed. 0.140 0.015 0.00 0.146 0.016 0.00 0.159 0.018 0.00
Share if those with higher ed. 0.132 0.015 0.00 0.137 0.016 0.00 0.136 0.016 0.00
Share of established business owners 7.533 1.506 0.00 7.244 1.442 0.00 12.60 2.57 0.00
Share of those who discontinued bus. 12.78 3.89 0.00 12.43 3.78 0.00 16.39 5.09 0.00
Share of those who financed bus 602.47 177.68 0.00 518.86 153.48 0.00 543.82 162.73 0.00
Constant 0.97 0.66 0.96 1.17 0.79 0.81 1.81 1.26 0.39
Note: Dependent: Actively involved in start-up effort, owner, no wages yet = 1. Logit models, odds ratios reported instead of
coefficients in the first column (odds ratios >1 indicate a positive effect, those <1 a negative effect); second column:
exponentiated robust SEs; third column: probability value. 1 year lag—refers to the initial level of the institutional variable at
year t-1, see Section 3. Country and year dummies included but not reported. Models 1 and 2 based on 1,459,199 individual
observations and 68 countries. Model 3 based on 1,413,914 observations and 69 countries.
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TABLE 4 Effects of 5-year changes in the rule of law on nascent entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3)
O. R. SE p O. R. SE p O. R. SE p
Institutional indicators (change and level)
Executive constraints: 5 years change 1.117 0.020 0.00
Executive constraints: 5 years lag 1.074 0.023 0.00
Institutionalized Democracy: 5 years change 1.070 0.009 0.00
Institutionalized Democracy: 5 years lag 1.073 0.011 0.00
Rule of Law (WB): 5 years change 1.004 0.010 0.65
Rule of Law (WB): 5 years lag 1.258 0.065 0.00
Control variables (individual level)
Age 1.114 0.002 0.00 1.114 0.002 0.00 1.113 0.003 0.00
Age squared 0.999 0.000 0.00 0.999 0.000 0.00 0.999 0.000 0.00
Female 0.630 0.005 0.00 0.630 0.005 0.00 0.655 0.006 0.00
Education = some secondary 1.096 0.023 0.00 1.097 0.023 0.00 1.120 0.024 0.00
Education = secondary 1.289 0.025 0.00 1.290 0.025 0.00 1.295 0.026 0.00
Education = tertiary 1.657 0.033 0.00 1.657 0.033 0.00 1.666 0.033 0.00
Manages and owns business >42 months 0.702 0.011 0.00 0.702 0.011 0.00 0.646 0.012 0.00
Discontinued a business in past 12 months 2.246 0.033 0.00 2.246 0.033 0.00 2.144 0.036 0.00
Financed new business(es) in past 3 years 2.067 0.029 0.00 2.067 0.029 0.00 1.949 0.031 0.00
Control variables (country level)
Business Freedom: 5 years change 0.999 0.001 0.55 0.999 0.001 0.50 0.993 0.002 0.00
Business Freedom: 5 years lag 1.007 0.001 0.00 1.008 0.001 0.00 0.996 0.002 0.11
GDP per person employed (const. PPP) 1.000 0.001 0.98 0.999 0.001 0.63 0.996 0.002 0.02
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 1.002 0.002 0.36 1.002 0.002 0.17 0.993 0.002 0.00
GDP growth (annual %) 1.001 0.002 0.56 1.001 0.002 0.62 1.009 0.002 0.00
Income inequality (Gini coefficient) 1.000 0.002 0.89 1.000 0.002 0.94 0.991 0.002 0.00
Mean age 0.846 0.025 0.00 0.833 0.024 0.00 0.854 0.030 0.00
Mean age squared 1.002 0.000 0.00 1.002 0.000 0.00 1.002 0.000 0.00
Share of females 0.597 0.114 0.01 0.573 0.109 0.00 0.223 0.053 0.00
Share of those with some secondary ed. 0.214 0.023 0.00 0.212 0.023 0.00 0.167 0.021 0.00
Share of those with secondary ed. 0.128 0.014 0.00 0.122 0.014 0.00 0.081 0.011 0.00
Share if those with higher ed. 0.119 0.014 0.00 0.117 0.014 0.00 0.074 0.010 0.00
Share of established business owners 4.955 1.012 0.00 5.768 1.172 0.00 9.480 2.342 0.00
Share of those who discontinued bus. 9.385 2.869 0.00 9.485 2.892 0.00 42.67 21.62 0.00
Share of those who financed bus 850.24 253.33 0.00 819.00 243.57 0.00 128.25 55.04 0.00
Constant 0.67 0.45 0.55 0.89 0.60 0.86 7.02 5.88 0.02
Note: Dependent: Actively involved in start-up effort, owner, no wages yet = 1. Logit models, odds ratios reported instead of
coefficients in the first column (odds ratios >1 indicate a positive effect, those <1 a negative effect); second column:
exponentiated robust SEs; third column: probability. 1 year lag—refers to the initial level of the institutional variable at year
t-1, see Section 3. Country and year dummies included but not reported. Models 1 and 2 based on 1,455,705 individual
observations and 67 countries. Model 3 based on 1,019,788 observations and 66 countries.
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highly significant and greater than one, implying a positive effect of institutional change on
entrepreneurship as expected. In sum, the likelihood of an individual's engagement in nascent
entrepreneurship changes in the same direction as the rule of law, independent of how the lat-
ter is measured. For changes over a 5-year period (Table 4), the results are again highly signifi-
cant for the two measures based on the Polity dataset, but not for the World Bank one. Yet
because of annual normalization, by construction there is a lot of noise in the 5-year compari-
sons for the World Bank variable; they are highly problematic.
Hypothesis (H2) examines the differential effect of the direction of change in the rule of law
(whether the rule of law improves or deteriorates) on entrepreneurial entry. Results in Table 5
show a highly significant negative effect of deterioration in the rule of law on entrepreneurship for
all indicators. In contrast, all the effects of the increase in the rule of law are insignificant. While
this is consistent with Hypothesis (H2), we employ a more rigorous approach, applying a post-
estimation test that compares: (a) the difference in coefficients between “no change” and “negative
change,” against (ii) the difference in coefficients between “positive change” and “no change.” As
based on the postestimation test, the effect is highly significant for all three indicators. For Execu-
tive constraints, we get χ2 = 16.72, p < .001, likewise for Institutionalized Democracy, we obtain
χ2 = 21.47, p < .001, and for the World Bank's Rule of law measure the result is equally strong:
χ2 = 48.24, p < .001). Thus, overall we find clear support for Hypothesis (H2) that deteriorations
in the rule of law have a more pronounced effect on entrepreneurship than improvements.
4.2 | Additional results
In our additional results, we consider change in regulations as a further set of institutions likely
to be relevant for entrepreneurial entry. We then test whether the effects of institutional change
on entrepreneurial entry differ for different types of entrepreneurs including those high and
low in human capital (education), and characterized by high and low growth expectations.
4.2.1 | Regulation
First, the level of liberal start-up regulations, as measured by the Business Freedom index, has a
consistent short-term positive impact on entrepreneurship. The results are highly significant in
all but one of the reported models in Tables 3–5. Interestingly, however, unlike the rule of law,
change in start-up regulations do not have any explanatory power: the results are consistently
insignificant in all models in Tables 3–5 (at the conventional 0.05 level) except one where the
coefficient comes with an unexpected sign; it seems that forward-looking expectations of
the entrepreneurs are not affected by changes in start-up regulations.
To be more confident of this sharp contrast between the way change in the rule of law ver-
sus in Business Freedom affect entrepreneurship, we explored this issue further, replacing Busi-
ness Freedom, with two other indices of regulation from the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street
Journal database that may affect entrepreneurial entry: Trade Freedom and Labor Freedom.
These additional results, for annual changes in Business Freedom, Trade Freedom and Labor
Freedom, are included in Table A2 of the online Appendix.
Importantly, the effect of change in the rule of law on entrepreneurship is robust to adding
either Trade Freedom or Labor Freedom providing continued support for Hypothesis (H1).
Moreover, unlike Business Freedom, both change in Trade Freedom and change in Labor
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TABLE 5 Effects of direction of change in the rule of law on nascent entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3)
O. R. SE p O. R. SE p O. R. SE p
Institutional variables
Executive constraints: 1 year change = decrease 0.665 0.055 0.00
Executive constraints: 1 year change = increase 1.009 0.045 0.84
Executive constraints: Level (1 year lag) 1.148 0.024 0.00
Inst. Democracy: 1 year change = decrease 0.680 0.049 0.00
Inst. Democracy: 1 year change = increase 0.993 0.039 0.86
Democracy: Level (1 year lag) 1.085 0.010 0.00
Rule of law (WB): 1 year change = decrease 0.880 0.011 0.00
Rule of law (WB): 1 year change = increase 0.982 0.011 0.13
Rule of law (WB): Level (1 year lag) 1.185 0.057 0.00
Control variables (individual level)
Age 1.114 0.002 0.00 1.114 0.002 0.00 1.115 0.002 0.00
Age squared 0.999 0.000 0.00 0.999 0.000 0.00 0.999 0.000 0.00
Female 0.629 0.005 0.00 0.629 0.005 0.00 0.629 0.005 0.00
Education = some secondary 1.096 0.023 0.00 1.095 0.023 0.00 1.106 0.023 0.00
Education = secondary 1.291 0.025 0.00 1.290 0.025 0.00 1.294 0.025 0.00
Education = tertiary 1.657 0.033 0.00 1.657 0.033 0.00 1.656 0.032 0.00
Manages and owns business older than 42 months 0.701 0.011 0.00 0.701 0.011 0.00 0.686 0.011 0.00
Discontinued a business in past 12 months 2.242 0.033 0.00 2.242 0.033 0.00 2.225 0.033 0.00
Financed new business(es) in past 3 years 2.076 0.029 0.00 2.076 0.029 0.00 2.076 0.029 0.00
Control variables (country level)
Business Freedom: Change (1 year) 0.997 0.002 0.08 0.997 0.002 0.08 0.998 0.002 0.28
Business Freedom: Level (1 year lag) 1.003 0.001 0.01 1.003 0.001 0.00 1.004 0.001 0.00
GDP per person employed 1.000 0.001 0.80 0.999 0.001 0.51 1.000 0.002 0.81
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 1.001 0.002 0.39 1.002 0.002 0.19 1.006 0.002 0.00
GDP growth (annual %) 1.002 0.002 0.20 1.003 0.002 0.12 1.002 0.002 0.33
Income inequality (Gini coefficient) 1.002 0.002 0.34 1.001 0.002 0.40 1.003 0.002 0.17
Mean age 0.828 0.024 0.00 0.829 0.024 0.00 0.828 0.025 0.00
Mean age squared 1.002 0.000 0.00 1.002 0.000 0.00 1.002 0.000 0.00
Share of females 0.471 0.089 0.00 0.462 0.088 0.00 0.315 0.062 0.00
Share of those with some secondary ed. 0.240 0.025 0.00 0.251 0.026 0.00 0.267 0.029 0.00
Share of those with secondary ed. 0.142 0.016 0.00 0.146 0.016 0.00 0.174 0.020 0.00
Share if those with higher education 0.134 0.015 0.00 0.138 0.016 0.00 0.147 0.017 0.00
Share of established business owners 7.351 1.482 0.00 7.168 1.436 0.00 14.12 2.90 0.00
Share of those who discontinued bus. 12.77 3.89 0.00 12.10 3.69 0.00 19.68 6.13 0.00
Share who financed businesses 623.60 184.10 0.00 525.55 155.55 0.00 442.42 132.16 0.00
Constant 2.28 1.55 0.23 2.43 1.65 0.19 1.90 1.32 0.36
Note: Dependent: Actively involved in start-up effort, owner, no wages yet = 1. Logit models, odds ratios reported instead of
coefficients in the first column (odds ratios >1 indicate a positive effect, those <1 a negative effect); second column:
exponentiated robust SEs; third column: probability. 1 year lag—refers to the initial level of the institutional variable at year
t-1, see Section 3. Country and year dummies included but not reported. Models 1 and 2 based on 1,459,199 individual
observations and 68 countries. Model 3 based on 1,413,914 observations and 69 countries. Reference (omitted) category for
change scores = no change (see Section 3).
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Freedom coefficients are positive and highly significant (p < .001). This makes sense considering
that the Business Freedom index relates to ease of entry and aggregates World Bank indicators
related to start-up requirements and procedures and licensing and permits. Prospecting entre-
preneurs are likely to be less sensitive to changes in these regulations as they know that they
are a one-off cost (that is, they are no longer relevant once a business has been created). By con-
trast, changes in trade and labor regulations, similar to the rule of law, can affect the long-term
prospects of their new ventures. Changes in trade and labor regulations increase uncertainty
about how easy it will be to trade, and to employ workers in their firm, which will have long-
term consequences on the day-to-day operations of their new ventures. Our results may also be
compared with those obtained for financial performance, regressed on changes in regulation by
Banalieva et al. (2018).
4.2.2 | Moderating effect of education
Human capital plays a central role in entrepreneurial entry decisions, yet its effect may be sen-
sitive to the rule of law (Estrin et al., 2016). Therefore, it is plausible to expect that the institu-
tional change effects we analyze will be conditioned by the level of education. Following that,
we interacted institutional change with the level of education. The results are available in
Table A3 of the online Appendix. Our initial intuition was that we will obtain stronger effects
on entry decisions for individuals who are highly educated, because they may be more sensitive
to institutional change due to higher opportunity costs. However, for our two core measures,
the results are opposite to what we expected: it is those with some secondary education (rather
than those with completed secondary or tertiary education) who are significantly affected by
changes in the rule of law (for the World Bank measure, the results are insignificant). This is
also confirmed by the marginal effects for Executive constraints, but not for alternative indica-
tors, see Figures A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix.
We have two tentative explanations for these results. First, these may be indicative of the
network effect (Batjargal et al., 2013; Ge et al., 2017). Highly educated people (and men, and
older people) are sheltered from institutional weaknesses, because they have stronger social
and political networks (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2008) and therefore they respond less to
change in institutional quality. Second, and somewhat related, our dependent variable is
engagement in a nascent start-up. It captures all types of new entrepreneurial projects, regard-
less of their value-added, and higher value-added is likely to counterbalance the additional costs
that come with lower institutional quality. These projects are also more likely to be pursued by
those with high education. In contrast, lower value-added projects, of “marginal
entrepreneurs,” will be more sensitive to changes in institutional quality. We will explore this
possibility next.
4.2.3 | Impact of institutional change on “low” versus “high value added”
entrepreneurship
A common proxy for the expected quality of entrepreneurial projects at time of entry is the job
growth aspirations of entrepreneurs (Estrin, Korosteleva, & Mickiewicz, 2013). Following that, we
estimated multinomial logit models with baseline taken to be no nascent entrepreneurship, and
two other possible outcomes: nascent projects with less than five jobs expected in 5 years, and
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nascent projects that expect to provide five or more jobs in 5 years. The results are available in
Table A4a,b of the Online Appendix. This model is demanding computationally and did not con-
verge for the World Bank's Rule of law measure. However, first, for the models for Executive con-
straints and for Institutionalized Democracy, the results are remarkably consistent: for both the level
of rule of law and changes in the rule of law, and regardless of the type of entry, the coefficients are
positive and significant, rendering additional support for Hypothesis (H1). Second, we performed
post estimation tests on the difference in coefficients between low and high growth aspirations
models. We obtained mixed results. For our preferred specification (Executive constraints), the coef-
ficient of change in the rule of law for low growth entry is significantly higher than that for high
growth entry (χ2 = 3.40, significance p < .01, Model 1). This is in line with the view of “marginal
entrepreneurs” discussed above: the lower value-added entrepreneurial projects are more sensitive
to change in institutional quality. However, this difference is not significant in the next equation,
when Executive constraints is replaced by Institutionalized Democracy indicators (Model 2).
It is worth noting one additional result. While income inequality is insignificant in our main
models, there is highly significant difference for its effects on low versus high aspiration entry.
Income inequality has no significant impact on low aspiration entry; however, it works against
high aspiration projects: possibly a larger share of the population is prevented by their low
income to engage in such ventures, as these require more investment.
5 | DISCUSSION
We enrich institutional theory by drawing attention to short-term institutional change, which
has been overlooked in favor of viewing institutions as stable, in existing approaches to institu-
tional theory. Moreover, Cuervo-Cazurra, Mudambi, and Pedersen (2019) highlight the impor-
tance of institutional analysis in global strategy research, but also that it is still missing insights
from politics and psychology. Responding to this, we integrate prospect theory from cognitive
psychology with institutional theory to conceptualize how change in political constitutional
institutions affects economic behavior. We test predictions about how short-term changes in
political constitutional institutions impact entrepreneurial entry. We focus on the rule of law as
a political constitutional institution that has been considered central not only to business, but
also to economic development, human welfare, and global governance (Skaaning, 2010).
In a multilevel study of 1.5 million individuals in up to 69 countries and spanning the years
2001–2015, we find that short-term changes in the rule of law and especially deteriorations in
the rule of law impact entrepreneurial entry. In extensions, we document that especially the
start-up efforts of “marginal” entrepreneurs are sensitive to changes in the rule of law. We now
turn to the theoretical implications of our findings.
5.1 | Enhancing institutional theory by considering short-term
institutional change
Our study contributes to institutional theory by introducing and conceptualizing short-term
institutional change to institutional theory, following the direction taken by Banalieva
et al. (2018). As outlined below, by building upon cognitive science, we can propose a frame-
work that enables us to explain how entrepreneurs respond to institutional change. As a result,
we complement the established static perspective on institutions which emphasizes their
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stability, in research on institutions in economics, sociology and management (e.g., Holmes
et al., 2011; North, 2005; Williamson, 2000) and in entrepreneurship (reviews: Urbano
et al., 2019; Terjesen et al., 2016). To institutional theory, we contribute novel insights into why
and in which way institutional change matters for economic behavior such as entrepreneurship.
Critically, we empirically demonstrate that short-term institutional change meaningfully shapes
entrepreneurial activity in addition to the static snapshots of institutions.
Drawing attention to short-term change, which is more often gradual rather than disruptive,
expands our understanding of institutions and opens new avenues for future research in institu-
tional theory and comparative entrepreneurship research. In particular, it is the short-term
time-scale of change and the often gradual nature of change in constitutional institutions that
has been overlooked. We empirically document that meaningful short-term change17 occurs,
consistent with the theoretical perspective of Mahoney and Thelen (2010). At the same time,
we complement research, which unlike ourselves focuses exclusively on the outliers in institu-
tional change, that is, on the effects of discontinuous, “shock-like” rapid institutional change
on entrepreneurship, for example when the Soviet system imploded (Estrin &
Mickiewicz, 2011; Smallbone & Welter, 2001). We also complement research that descriptively
documents long-run institutional changes taking place of decades or centuries from a historical
perspective (e.g., North, 1990, 2005).
In sum, we offer a new theoretical perspective to understand institutional change anchored
in insights from cognitive science. This perspective enables us to consider the hitherto over-
looked “middle ground” between stability and discontinuous drastic change in institutions
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). It also critically enables us to theorize about the difference in rele-
vance of institutional deterioration and institutional improvement, whereby the former is more
consequential than the latter. We discuss the behavioral foundation of institutional theory that
underpins this argument in the section on enhancing institutional theory with cognitive science
below.
For entrepreneurship research, the institutional change perspective expands the current
understanding of “context” and allows to formulate predictions regarding why, when, and what
type of short-term institutional change becomes either an enabler or an inhibitor of entrepre-
neurship (Davidsson et al., 2020). By demonstrating that such short-term institutional change
matters and by unpacking which types of changes are most impactful, our research responds to
recent calls by entrepreneurship researchers to start investigating changes in context
(Davidsson, 2020) and to develop more time-sensitive entrepreneurship research (Lévesque &
Stephan, 2020). While we focus on effects of short-term institutional change on entrepreneurial
decisions, we hope that future research takes our findings as a springboard to understand what
other time scales in environmental change may matter and in what way.
5.2 | Enhancing institutional theory with cognitive science to
understand the impact of change
Our research enhances economic institutional theory by developing its behavioral assumptions,
drawing on prospect theory from cognitive science (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979). This delivers a more accurate understanding of the mechanisms of how
and why institutions and institutional change affect individual economic activity such as entre-
preneurial entry. Cognitive science highlights cognitive processes through which (potential)
entrepreneurs assess and understand the complexity of the outside world. Rather than depicting
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individuals as actors who respond fully rationally to the institutions around them, cognitive sci-
ence helps us to develop a new and “more humane” perspective of how actors understand and
respond to economic institutions (Estrin et al., 2017). Actors respond in ecologically rational
ways employing heuristic thinking rather than optimally weighting and considering all infor-
mation (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). This perspective helps to understand why institutional
change has the important effects on entrepreneurial entry that our study documents. First, it
helps to comprehend the significance of studying institutional change. Ecologically rational
individuals are particularly sensitive to change, because change in itself introduces uncertainty
(Kahneman, 2011). Second, it helps to understand the asymmetric impact of deteriorations in
the rule of law compared with improvements. Deteriorations are more threatening than
improvements (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and thus attract more attention to avert potential
resource losses (Hobfoll, 1989).
This gives future research a broader toolkit to study the effects of institutions on economic
behavior, of which entrepreneurship is just one example. Cognitive science has documented the
underpinning mechanisms and relevance of heuristic thinking for a range of decision domains,
including for human resource decisions of managers (Luan et al., 2019), investment decisions,
consumer behavior, and health decisions (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). These decision
domains present fruitful avenues to extend the analysis of institutions and how they shape dif-
ferent aspects of our life. In particular, understanding the impact of institutions and institu-
tional change on the strategic responses of CEOs through the lens of “homo heuristicus”
(Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009), as presented here, seems promising. CEOs like entrepreneurs
are more directly exposed to their institutional context—unlike employees for whom the orga-
nization they work for “buffers” the impact of the institutional context.
More generally, the salient influence of recent events and change in the institutional context
has implications for any action that involves future-oriented investments such as innovation,
growth, internationalization, or engagement in social value creation. Such research can build
on further insights from cognitive science on heuristics, for instance about how temporal close-
ness of events impact individual investment behavior differentially, comparing the effects of
events that are further in the future versus those that are more immediate (Kahneman, 2011;
Lévesque & Stephan, 2020). Integrating such predictions with institutional theory offers rich
opportunities to develop broader dedicated theory and research on the impact of institutional
context on entrepreneurship and managerial behaviors in global strategy research.
More specifically, we hope that our study can inspire a new line of research on institutions
and entrepreneurship that helps to achieve a more complete and in-depth understanding of
institutions by looking at the behavioral microfoundations of context-conditioned entrepreneur-
ial decisions. The innovativeness of our approach is that while much of the institutions–
entrepreneurship literature starts with macroinstitutional features and asks how these affect
entrepreneurial decisions and strategies, our starting point is to understand the decision-
making process of the (potential) entrepreneurs. We believe this is a necessary condition to
understand the regularities in the impact of context on entrepreneurship, and that cognitive sci-
ence insights play an important role here.
5.3 | Future research
Our results equally point to the relevance of overall levels of institutions (rule of law) as well as
change in institutions. Our recommendation is therefore that future research should consider
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both—levels and change—as one may mask the effect of the other, and outcomes that we to
date attribute to weak institutions may be biased by omitting changes (especially deteriorations)
from the models.
While our findings reinforce the importance of both the rule of law for entrepreneurship,
and a short-term impact of some aspects of regulatory change (labor, trade), we hope future
research might also consider change in institutional configurations for example in analogy with
those laid out in the varieties of capitalism approach (e.g., Herrmann, 2019). Indeed, some
authors have criticized the latter for the lack of consideration of change (e.g., Heyes, Lewis, &
Clark, 2012, but see Hall & Thelen, 2009). Widening our analyses to change in configurations of
institutions offers thus scope for new contributions to institutional theory as applied to business
research. Such change of perspective may also require considering different methods, including
those based on set-theory (Decker, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2020).
Further, Williamson (2000) argues that informal institutions are critical for all other
components of the institutional system and human action, but suggests that their changes
are unlikely to be detected in the short-term. He considers these changes to unfold over
hundreds of years.18 Thus, change in informal institutions may be particularly difficult to
research. In contrast, although changes in formal institutions are not necessarily frequent,
they are, relatively speaking, easier to identify, because they are defined as discrete ele-
ments. Compared to informal institutions, elements of law and regulation are more objec-
tively identifiable, typically in the forms of written down unambiguous rules. This makes it
easier to trace and catalogue any violations or changes in them. Thus, the challenge is to
conceptualize and identify short-term changes in culture, values, and informal institutions.
These changes happen as well (Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2012), and their effects on entrepre-
neurship may be tangible.
Last but not least, institutional change may affect different types of entrepreneurship in
different ways. While we focused on the overall propensity to start new ventures, it is likely
that institutional change will also affect the composition of entrepreneurship. Sutter
et al. (2017) discuss the process of formalization, that is, the transition of entrepreneurs from
informal to formal markets. Entrepreneurs may prefer informal entrepreneurship when for-
mal institutions deteriorate. Furthermore, there may be differences in the propensity to start
new businesses by first-time and serial entrepreneurs, responding to institutional change. To
focus on learning processes of serial entrepreneurs would be consistent with the perspective
of cognitive psychology we adopt for our paper. Take, for example, Thailand that stands out
in our sample with what seems to be a turbulent institutional environment. Will serial entre-
preneurs with more experience respond more strongly to institutional deterioration, given
they likely experienced it before? Or will they be more protected from institutional deteriora-
tion given they are more sheltered by informal networks they built in their earlier business
activity, in line with the effects described by Batjargal et al. (2013)? We do not have answers
to these questions, just yet.
5.4 | Limitations
The limitations of our study are the limitations of the data we can mobilize. Even though, the
GEM has generated harmonized data on entrepreneurship for an unprecedented number of
countries and years, it would be, as always, desirable to include more countries and further
years. Less developed economies tend to be less well represented in the country sample and
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over time. We note that as of today there is no similar database that would allow an analysis
over a similar time frame and spanning a similar number of economies.
While we build on long-standing research in cognitive science and heuristics to develop our
hypotheses and found support for most of them, it would be preferable to include direct mea-
sures of cognitive mechanisms. Due to the scale and scope of the data collection effort required,
this is currently not a realistic endeavor. We hope that future research might complement our
analyses for instance by testing mechanisms in lab or field experiments. We note that this limi-
tation is not unique to our study; past research that assumes rationally optimizing actors
(instead of actors deploying heuristic thinking) also does not assess these microlevel mecha-
nisms directly. We hope future research can incorporate microlevel measures of mechanisms
into institutional analysis.
5.5 | Practical implications
Investigating short-term institutional change opens new possibilities for practical interventions.
If the emphasis is on institutions as the long-term fixed characteristics of an economy, policy
makers cannot see themselves affecting any visible change during their time in office. However,
an emphasis on short-term institutional changes calls for renewed action from policy makers to
work toward creating strong rule of law, to stimulate entrepreneurship. Building such institu-
tions helps to develop entrepreneurship over time; yet, even incremental improvements in the
rule of law have important positive effects on entrepreneurship.
At the same time, our findings about the particularly detrimental effects of deterioration in
the rule of law also clearly caution policy makers to refrain from restricting the rule of law. As
the current coronavirus pandemic demonstrates, sometimes limits to individual freedoms are
implemented to protect public health; yet policy makers should be under no illusion about their
more indirect negative impact on entrepreneurship. Complementing such measures with tem-
porary tax reliefs or other support for existing entrepreneurs is likely to help those in business.
However, based on our findings we expect Covid-19 may have a long-lasting negative effect on
entrepreneurship if entrepreneurs interpret the sudden restrictions on their freedom as an indi-
cation of longer-term institutional conversion.
Overall, we find that changes in the rule of law have more pronounced effects than changes
in regulation, even if the latter matter as well as documented by our additional results. How-
ever, policy makers tend to focus on the latter—it is easier to change the number of procedures
to register a business than it is to develop the fundamental rule of law of a country. Yet, such
harder work has bigger payoffs in terms of entry into entrepreneurship.
6 | CONCLUSION
As we hope our framework and findings demonstrate, it is promising to adopt a perspective of
microfoundations that integrate insights from cognitive science to explain how individuals
respond to environmental changes in their entrepreneurial decisions. We show how valuable
this is for conceptualizing the effects of short-term institutional changes. We hope our work can
inspire new avenues for theorizing both about institutions and entrepreneurship, by consider-
ing change over time while applying cognitive lenses to entrepreneurial choices. Future work
may also apply this perspective to strategic choices of CEOs.





1 Prospect theory is applied as the main theory framework to explain entrepreneurial outcomes in Estrin, Mic-
kiewicz, and Rebmann (2017).
2 Rothstein (2013) links the concept of the quality of government to rule of law. Consistent with our discussion
above, he places Dworkin's (1977) concept of equal concern and respect as the ultimate foundation of the rule
of law. The exact opposite of the latter, that is, the low quality of government, is discrimination, which can be
brought about by clientelism, nepotism, or corruption.
3 Opening out to international trade and investment also played a role, yet interestingly also early inflows of
FDI can be linked to the initiatives by mainland Chinese entrepreneurs (Huang, 2003).
4 Institutional conversion is a specific type of gradual institutional change considered by Mahoney and
Thelen (2010). Two others are drift and layering (Mahoney and Thelen (2010), pp. 15–18).
5 In a recent “Nations in Transit” report, Hungary is given as a prime example of gradual and steady erosion of
the rule of law over a decade. See: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2018 as
accessed on the April 12, 2018.
6 Accessed on November 23, 2020 from https://www.ft.com/content/117349e4-dc95-4509-969b-26dcdede1773.
7 On North Macedonia, again: “Nations in Transit” report, source as in footnote 5.
8 Note that the work on heuristics and cognitive science explains commonalities in perception and thinking of
all individuals, rather than focusing on personality differences between individuals, which is the more popular
application of psychology in entrepreneurship (Gorgievski & Stephan, 2016).
9 Prospect theory finds “loss aversion” to be a fundamental feature of human decision-making (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992): “A salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare is that losses loom larger than
gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 279). Loss aversion implies an asymmetric assessment of losses and
gains by decision makers. It is the asymmetry element that makes it different from both risk aversion,
and ambiguity aversion that is often considered in the context of entrepreneurship (Koudstaal, Sloof, & van
Praag, 2016). Supporting this view, empirical evidence obtained by Koudstaal et al. (2016) suggests that it is
neither (symmetrical) risk aversion, nor relative ambiguity aversion (as postulated since Knight, 2009[1921]),
but specifically loss aversion, that plays an important role in the decision to entry entrepreneurship.
10 Ge, Stanley, Eddleston, and Kellermanns (2017) observe that in many institutional contexts, of emerging mar-
kets in particular, institutional deterioration may not be universally perceived as negative or as undermining
entrepreneurship. Rather institutional deterioration may even lead to new entrepreneurial opportunities,
especially if entrepreneurs can mobilize political and social connections to their advantage. This perspective is
anchored in contributions that emphasize the role of networks in weak institutional environments as a means
to create and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Batjargal et al., 2013). However, at any given time, a
minority of entrepreneurs will have the relevant networks and political connections to generate significant
new opportunities that exploit institutional weaknesses. Thus, while such effects may weaken, they will not
eliminate the relationship we postulate.
11 Note, however, that drawing upon cognitive heuristics, in the theoretical discussion motivating Hypothesis (H1),
we assumed that mental shortcuts lead the potential entrepreneurs to react strongly to any change.
12 The tension is significantly alleviated (but never completely resolved) by the model of constitutional democ-
racy (Møller & Skaaning, 2012). Accordingly, the construct used by Polity IV, Institutionalized Democracy,
emphasize precisely this aspect: within this measure, the electoral process is balanced by the constitutionally
defined constraints on the executive power of the government, alleviating the threat of majoritarian tyranny.
13 An alternative would be to use unemployment rate. Both are correlated, and we verified it makes no differ-
ence for the results which one is used.
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14 We constructed the Gini coefficient variable from the World Income Inequality Database (United Nations)
and we thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. A do file that corresponds to the rules we applied
in handling the raw inequality data is available on request.
15 We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for excellent insights and discussion of methodology with atten-
tion to detail.
16 The data and the codes that generated our results are available at Research Gate.
17 Empirically, we establish that institutional changes are sufficiently discontinuous and pronounced for short-
term change to be detected in annual data (see minimum and maximum values and SDs in Table 2).
18 In the context of entrepreneurship, Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) discuss changes in societal values in time
intervals corresponding to generations, rather than hundreds of years as laid out by Williamson (2000). This
generational perspective is further developed by Zhang and Acs (2018).
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